III. Response for Petroleum Shortages
IV. Regional Electricity Shortages
Other Sites of Interest on the Web
upply shortages or disruptions can ultimately
affect every person and every economic sector in the state. The ability to anticipate
supply shortages, and respond appropriately to supply disruptions — such as the
widespread power outages across the Western U.S. this summer or the extended power outages
in Eastern Washington resulting from the devastating winter storms in November 1996 —
can help mitigate the severity of emergencies.
afe and reliable supplies of energy underpin
essential services such as heating, lighting, refrigeration, transportation, and
communications. Energy emergencies — supply shortages or disruptions — can be
extraordinarily devastating. They have economic consequences, and they can threaten lives
and property.
Electricity emergencies have the greatest potential for causing loss of life and affecting health and safety. Unlike oil and gas emergencies, where electricity can be used to provide heat, the loss of electricity shuts off all heating systems that require ignition or fans. Electricity emergencies also affect lighting, water and sewer processing and pumping services, food processing, refrigeration, communications, life support systems, security systems, banking and bankcard services, and gasoline pumping.
Prevention provides the first line of defense. Energy distribution companies design strong and redundant systems to guard against failures. But failures will occur, and contingency plans are needed to address a full range of emergency situations — from economic inconvenience to major disasters. Energy suppliers handle most emergencies, with the state providing assistance as needed. In more severe emergencies, the state plays a larger role. During a major catastrophe, for example, the Emergency Management Division (EMD) of the Military Department coordinates all public and private response efforts including any interaction with federal agencies.
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ashington's energy systems are vulnerable to two
types of emergencies: acute system failures, usually caused by accidents or severe
weather, and supply shortages.
All energy delivery systems are vulnerable to accidents and disasters. However, petroleum and natural gas disruptions are quite rare and tend to have economic rather than life-threatening consequences. Electricity system failures are more common and more serious.
With increasing reliance on natural gas-fired electricity generation, there may be more potential for combined natural gas/electricity emergencies. During very cold weather there could be strong demand for natural gas for both heating and electricity generation. Currently, Washington's natural gas infrastructure is sufficient to meet even extraordinary demand. As demand increases, the infrastructure may have to expand.
Acute electric system failures usually result from storms or accidents that damage facilities and equipment. When this happens, the supply of energy cannot reach users until the damage has been repaired and service restored.
For example, numerous state agencies gathered under the direction of the Military Department's Emergency Management Division to assist utilities, businesses, citizens, and local governments in response to the December 1995 windstorm that caused 650,000 customers to be without power (about half the number of customers affected in the infamous January 1993 Inauguration Day Storm). Energy Policy staff communicated with utilities to develop a damage assessment report and to calculate the nature, extent, location and possible duration of the power outage; acted as liaison between utilities and other agencies; notified utilities of road closures in their area; and linked Puget Power with the State Patrol to facilitate accelerated and mass permitting of B.C. Hydro utility repair trucks coming across the border to assist with system recovery.
Much broader system failures occurred in the Western U.S. in the summer of 1996. The first blackout occurred July 2 when hot weather caused a power line in Idaho to sag too close to a tree, causing an electrical arc to short-circuit the line. During the next 35 seconds, two million customers in 14 states experienced power interruptions as the entire electrical system automatically separated into five electrically separate "islands" in order to avert major damage to generation and transmission facilities. The August 10 outage was even more extensive, affecting 7.5 million customers and businesses throughout the West. A series of events caused this outage: high loads on the Northwest transmission system caused by hot weather throughout much of the region; some system equipment out of service; power lines sagging too close to trees; and a resulting chain reaction that shut down the main Pacific intertie between the Northwest and California. Although Washington remained relatively unaffected during both of these power failures, Energy Policy staff worked closely with Emergency Management, utilities in the Western U.S., the Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville), the Western Systems Coordinating Council, and the Northwest Power Pool to gather and exchange information in order to assess the situation as it was occurring and determine its affect on Washington State.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has analyzed these outages extensively and has determined that the present institutional framework, which promotes reliability through a largely voluntary and self-regulating system worked well in these incidents. DOE believes the system will continue to work well in the future, provided that it can adapt to the new competitive environment facing the industry. [Note 1] However, there has also been concern that power outages may become more common as deregulation increases the number of energy suppliers using the grid to transmit power, and as utilities attempt to cut costs in the new competitive utility environment by not investing enough in maintenance. The Western Systems Coordinating Council has prepared a report with a complete analysis, conclusions and recommendations to prevent these types of electric power disruptions in the future. [Note 2]
Energy supply shortages can also result from accidents or disasters. For example, the locks on the Columbia River are closed for two-weeks every year for major repairs and maintenance. Petroleum companies know of these routine closures months in advance and prepare by shipping extra barges of petroleum products up the Columbia River in the weeks before the closure. In February 1996, however, Washington experienced the worst flooding in many years. Because of extremely high water on the Columbia River, the Coast Guard closed the river to navigation because of the hazard to shipping caused by large floating debris. This emergency closure occurred just days before the scheduled closure of the locks were to take place. Consequently, not as many petroleum barges made it up-river to the Tri-Cities as planned, and companies were unable to stockpile as much product.
The Governor's Office contacted Energy Policy staff to research the situation to determine the severity and extent of the potential petroleum shortage. Energy Policy staff contacted barge operators, petroleum companies, and other governmental agencies to assess the situation and provide information to the Governor's Office and Emergency Management. All petroleum companies confirmed that supplies of various products were low in the Tri-Cities area, but that they were independently taking actions, such as increasing trucking of petroleum products, to ensure that distributor and customer demands were met. Localized shortages could have developed, however, if customers or distributors made unusually large purchases because they anticipated higher prices. This exceptional demand could have outstripped the distribution system's ability to respond.
More extensive energy shortages normally result from a broader set of causes. For example, war in the Persian Gulf could create a severe worldwide shortage of oil. Drought in the Northwest could set the stage for insufficient winter supplies of electricity. Because shortages have different causes than acute system failures, they require a different response. Demand needs to be restrained to meet available supply until supply can be increased. Repairing facilities usually does not factor into the response.
Unlike most acute system failures, addressing significant energy shortages requires substantial state involvement. Efforts center on getting the public to respond correctly by reducing energy consumption. State leadership in raising public awareness and educating consumers is critical.
Allocating scarce energy supplies to ensure that essential service providers have fuel may also be required. Because allocation can be quite contentious, state leadership is required to ensure effective and equitable distribution. In the case of extreme shortages, some rather demanding steps may have to be taken — such as waiving environmental restrictions on certain types of energy use. This can only be done under the guidance and authority of the Governor's emergency powers.
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he major impact of most petroleum shortages is
economic: prices rise to reflect limited supplies. Steep or rapid rises in price can cause
a variety of economic problems. These problems adversely affect people with low or fixed
incomes. Businesses that depend heavily on transportation may be threatened by increased
cost of doing business. Furthermore, if a shortage is very extreme, pricing alone cannot
guarantee sufficient fuel to essential service providers.
Within two weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, gasoline prices rose 20 percent in Washington. When the Iraqi army collapsed, prices returned to pre-war levels and a shortage was averted. Prices during an actual shortage could have gone much higher.
In the months preceding the Persian Gulf war, Energy Policy staff prepared the state for the possibility of a major oil shortage. Efforts concentrated on public education and the preparedness of state agencies, local governments, essential service providers, and transit agencies. Arrangements were made with oil companies for responding to critical needs and administering fuel allocations in case such steps were necessary.
This exercise revealed strengths and weaknesses in the state's existing Petroleum Products Contingency Plan. The plan requires serious updating, which will take place this biennium. At the same time, Energy Policy staff will and review and revise the administrative rule for dealing with petroleum emergencies to reflect changes in the industry, in federal regulations, and in policies for addressing petroleum shortages.
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ne type of electricity shortage is the inability
to meet daily peak demand. The Northwest's vast hydroelectric system historically has
provided a peaking capacity far beyond Washington's daily needs. However, some areas of
the state, notably the Puget Sound region, are beginning to experience occasional
difficulty meeting daily peak demand. This emerging problem results from transmission
constraints and bottlenecks, not insufficient generation, and is being addressed by the
utility industry.
Electricity systems also have seasonal peaks; Washington's comes in the winter when demand for heating increases. The region is unlikely to experience an electricity shortage as the direct result of seasonal peaks, however. Utilities can foresee a shortage by monitoring reservoir levels and weather. As fall and winter progress, utilities can work to avert such a shortage by building and operating thermal and nuclear generation and purchasing more energy from out of state. The result is higher energy costs, but no winter shortage.
A cursory analysis performed by Bonneville in 1992 estimated that, even in the worst water years and with extremely cold weather, most shortages could be handled with a minimal voluntary effort. Years of drought and cold weather are those where such a shortage is most likely. Figures 1 and 2 provide historical information on Columbia River runoff and reservoir levels.
If a shortage occurs, it will be regional in nature. The provinces and states of the Northwest Power Pool (Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Montana, British Columbia and Alberta), coordinate operation of the hydroelectric system to maximize its efficiency and potential.
In addition, the entire Western United States is interconnected by a single, large transmission grid. Within the grid, electrons do not recognize state borders. If there ever is insufficient energy to meet load on the grid, all Western states will face the same shortage. Recognizing the regional nature of electricity supplies, the four Northwestern states have adopted a regional approach for managing a shortage.
The Northwest's electric utilities, public utility commissions and state energy offices worked together to update the Regional Curtailment Plan for Electric Energy. The four states used the regional plan as a model and adopted similar state plans. In November 1994, the Washington State Curtailment Plan for Electric Energy was adopted as administrative rule (WAC 194-22). During the next year Energy Policy Staff will review Washington's Curtailment Plan to determine if any revisions are necessary based on the restructuring of the electric industry.
The plan calls for the four Northwest states to initiate curtailment actions jointly. Washington's plan emphasizes voluntary curtailment and equal curtailment requirements for residential, commercial, and industrial customers. The plan has five stages; each level represents a more severe shortage that requires sterner steps. The first two stages are voluntary. The final three stages are mandatory. Consuming sectors are treated equally until stage four, where greater requirements to reduce consumption are placed on commercial and industrial customers. State law requires that such emergencies be implemented by CTED under the guidance and direction of the Governor's Office. Under the most severe emergencies, an emergency legislative committee is convened and the Governor's emergency powers are activated (RCW 45.21G).
Figure 4-1. Columbia River Runoff Can Vary Substantially from Year to Year
Figure 4-2. Below Normal Water Storage a Result of Recent
Droughts
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he safety and welfare of Washington's residents
are occasionally threatened by energy emergencies, disruptions, and shortages.
Preparedness and speedy, correct responses can minimize these threats. Being prepared
requires maintenance of a response program to ensure contacts are current, response
personnel are properly trained, and response plans work well within evolving energy
markets and infrastructure. CTED's Energy Policy staff lends expertise to utilities and
other state agencies as needed to mitigate the effects of acute system failures and
localized outages. By statute, CTED is also responsible for administering contingency
plans; coordinating a response to petroleum and electricity supply shortages; and
administering the Governor's energy emergency powers (RCW 43.21F and G).
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Note 1. See The Electric Power Outages in the Western United States, July 2-3, 1996 - Report to the President; U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC; August 1996.
Note 2. See Western Systems Coordinating Council Disturbance Report For the Power System Outage that Occurred on the Western Interconnection, August 10, 1996; Approved by the WSCC Operations Committee on October 18, 1996.
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Washington State Military Department, Emergency Management Division
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The print version of the 1997 Biennial Energy Report is available free of charge. To order, contact Julie Palakovich at (360) 956-2098, or send e-mail to wepg@ep.cted.wa.gov.